期刊文献+

可口可乐拟并购汇源案的竞争损害分析 被引量:24

An Economic Analysis of the Coca-Cola-Huiyuan Case
原文传递
导出
摘要 本文采用定量方法对可口可乐拟并购汇源案的竞争影响进行了初步分析。首先,本文利用中国软饮料4位数行业的产销数据,估计了碳酸饮料和果汁的需求函数,然后采用假定垄断者测试方法,界定了本案的相关市场,最后分别采用结构方法和并购模拟方法评估了本案的单边效应。研究结果显示,碳酸饮料和果汁分处两个相关市场,并且此案在果汁市场产生较为显著的单边效应。这个结果表明,尽管商务部否决此次并购的决定是合理的,但竞争损害并非来自似是而非的组合效应,而是果汁市场的单边效应。 This paper revisits the Coca-Cola/Huiyuan case using quantitative methods.We first estimate the demand system of carbonated soft drinks and juice using the 4-digit code data of the Chinese soft drink industry.We then define the relevant market by implementing the SSNIP test.Finally,we evaluate the unilateral effect in the juice market by structural method and merger simulation.Our results show that carbonated soft drinks and juice are in two separate relevant markets and,more importantly,there may be significant unilateral effect in the juice market based on scenario analysis.This result confirms the MOFCOM decision itself but meanwhile points out that the competition harm comes more from unilateral effect rather than the dubious portfolio effect.
作者 黄坤 张昕竹
出处 《中国工业经济》 CSSCI 北大核心 2010年第12期86-96,共11页 China Industrial Economics
关键词 反垄断 相关市场界定 单边效应 并购模拟 anti-monopoly definition of relevant market unilateral effect merger simulation
  • 相关文献

参考文献21

  • 1Abere, A., O.Capps Jr, J. Church, H. A. Love. Mergers and Market Power: Estimating the Effect on Market Power of the Proposed Acquisition by the Coca-Cola Company of Cadbury Schweppes' Carbonated Soft Drinks in Canada[A], in Slottje, D. J. Measuring Market Power[C]. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2002.
  • 2Barnett, A. William. Theoretical Foundations for the Rotterdam Model [J]. Review of Economic Studies, 1979, 46(1).
  • 3Barnett, A. W., O. Seck. Rotterdam Model Versus Almost Ideal Demand System: Will the Best Specification Please Stand up[J]. Jounal of Applied Econometrics, 2008, 23(6).
  • 4Budzinski, O., I. Ruhmer. Merger Simulation in Competition Policy: A Survey [J]. Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 2009, 6(2).
  • 5Davis P., E. Garces. Quantitative Techniques for Competition and Antitrust Analysis [A]. London: Princeton University Press, 2009.
  • 6Deaton A, J.Muellbauer. An Almost Ideal Demand System[J]. American Economic Review, 1980, 70(3).
  • 7Deng, Fei, A. Emch, and G. K. Leonard. A Hard Landing in the Soft Drink Market-MOFCOM's Veto of the Coca-Cola & Huiyuane?Deal[J]. Global Competition Policy Magazine,2009, (April).
  • 8Dube, J. Pierre. Multiple Discreteness and Product Differentiation: Demand for Carbonated Soft Drinks[J]. Marketing Science, 2004, 23(1).
  • 9Giacomo, M. D. Empirical Analysis of Markets with Differentiated Products: The Characteristics Approach [J]. Giornale degli Economisti e Annali Economia, 2004, 63(2).
  • 10Hausman, J., G. Leonard, and J. D. Zona. Competitive Analysis with Differentiated Products [J]. Annales d' Economie et Statistique, 1994, (34).

同被引文献499

引证文献24

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部