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规制变革下的企业董事会动态特征——基于转型期中国发电类上市公司的研究 被引量:1

The Dynamics of Board of Directors under Deregulation in Transition——An Empirical Analysis Based on Chinese Listed Power Companies
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摘要 本文在考虑以往规制研究不足之处的基础上,构建了"规制影响企业董事会特征,但影响程度取决于被规制企业政治资源强弱"这样一个研究框架,在该框架下考察转型期中国特殊制度背景下,规制变革对被规制企业董事会结构、功能和行为等三个方面的影响,以及被规制企业政治资源在其中的调节性作用。由于企业间政治资源强弱有别,以及由此导致的与规制机构相对谈判力不同,放松规制下企业董事会动态变化的程度也存在着差异,我们的实证研究结果基本支持这一假说,从而加深了学界对规制变革与公司治理之间动态关联的认识。 Under the framework of "regulation influences corporate governance,but the mode of influence depends on the institutional background,in which the regulation is embedded",this paper focus on the impact of regulation change on the corporate board characteristics of structure,function,and behaviour in transition economy.Our sample is from China power industry,which had undergone a huge deregulation reform since 2002.Although deregulation always means competition is induced and uncertainty is increased,in light of China's special institutional feature,the influence of deregulation on power firm's board characteristics is very depended on the firm's political resource.The empirical results support these hypotheses.
作者 姜涛
出处 《中国工业经济》 CSSCI 北大核心 2010年第12期117-126,共10页 China Industrial Economics
基金 内蒙古自治区自然科学基金面上项目"规制环境下的内蒙古电力生产企业的公司治理与企业效率研究"(批准号2010MS1005) 内蒙古大学高层次人才引进科研启动项目"中国电力生产企业的公司治理与企业效率研究"(批准号Z20090101)
关键词 转型 放松规制 政治资源 董事会特征 transition deregulation political resource board characteristics
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