现代企业组织制度中的委托──代理关系

The Principal-Agent Relations in Organization Institution of Modern Enterprises

现代企业组织制度中存在一系列委托──代理关系，基于所有权和经营权相分离的委托──代理制既是必要的，有效的，又存在着委托人和代理人的效用函数不同的矛盾。西方管理学家对委托人目标和代理人效用函数的不一致性进行了研究，提出了委托──代理理论。本文简要介绍这一理论，并从对代理人的考核评价和奖惩、实行目标管理、培育企业文化以及建设正常运行的市场四个方面，论述了建立健全激励──约束机制，改善委托──代理关系的途径。

There are a selles of principal-agent relations in organization institution of modern enterprises. The principal-agent mechanism based on separating of proprietary rights and management rights isnot only necessary and effective, but also there is contradictory of difference between utility of functions ofprincipal and agent. West management scientists have researched on the difference between utlility functionsof principal and agent. They suggested theory of principal-agent. This paper gives a brief introduction tothe theroy, and discusses the construction of healthy encouragement-constraint mechanism and the ways toimprove principal-agent relations through assessing and rewarding/punishing to agent, imPlementing objective management, cultivating enterprise culture, and constructing normal running market.