活跃连接下Wright-Fisher过程的演化动态

Evolutionary Dynamics of Wright-Fisher Process under Active Linking

在活跃连接下讨论了2×2对称博弈中频率相依Wright-Fisher过程的演化动力学,得到弱选择下策略的固定概率.利用固定概率讨论囚徒困境与雪堆博弈的演化动态,给出促使合作行为的条件.最后对所得结果进行数值模拟,发现活跃连接可以有效地促进合作行为.

This paper studies evolutionary dynamics of frequency-dependent Wright-Fisher process in 2×2 symmetric game under active linking.We give the concrete presentation of fixation probabilities under weak selection and study evolutionary dynamics of Prisoner＇s dilemma and Snowdrift game by means of fixation probabilities.We also give the conditions which can lead to cooperative behavior.Finally,some numerical simulations are presented,and the results show that active linking can facilitate cooperative behavior effectively.