罗马法中的人格:法律主体资格抑或权利主体资格

Personality in Roman Law: Qualifications of Legal Subject or Rights Subject

罗马法中的人格概念,构成了当今私法学界有关人格理论研究的话语平台。然而,对这个元概念的界定却形成了法律主体资格说和权利主体资格说两种不同的表述。在罗马法中,人格是"法律资格"的表达更符合历史和法律认知水平;"权利主体资格"以权利概念的产生为前提条件,在当时的罗马社会,还不具备建立在真正个人主义观念基础上的权利观。权利概念的正式形成要等到18世纪的康德哲学。

The concept of personality in Roman law constitutes the academic discourse platform of today＇ s civil personality theories. However, the definition of the elemental concept has formed two different interpretations： qualifications of legal subject or rights subject. In Roman law, the personality of the qualifications of legal subject is more in line with the history and law. Qualifications of rights subject to the concept regarded rights as a prerequisite, which did not yet establish a genuine individualism at the time of the Roman society. The concept of rights was officially formed by Kant philosophy in the 18th century.