产品多样化、产品质量与中国药品价格管制绩效

Diversification,Product Quality and Performances of Price Ceiling in China’s Pharmaceutical Industry

本文以二级价格歧视模型为基础,通过引入对不同产品种类的非对称价格上限管制讨论了中国药品价格管制背景下厂商的产品质量和产品多样化决策,并由此分析了管制的实际效果。研究表明,对基本药品和高价药品的价格管制均会降低被管制药品的质量,并且当价格上限低于一定水平时,厂商会放弃产品多样化,转而提供单一产品,从而形成"降价死",而在此过程中,基本药品消费者的福利不会改善;相对于无管制状态而言,对基本药品的价格管制会导致社会福利的损失,而对高价药品的价格管制在一定范围内可以提高社会福利。本文还联系中国药品价格管制实践,应用模型分析结论解释了中国药品安全问题和"降价死"现象产生的主要原因,并结合中国药品市场的主要管制制度提出了政策建议。

This paper, through adjusting the standard model of second-degree price discrimination with asymmetric price controls, discusses China’s pharmaceutical firms’ quality and diversification strategies under price ceiling, and performances of the regulation.The analysis shows that, both price ceilings on basic pharmaceuticals and high-price-quality pharmaceuticals will cause product qualities to decrease. When the price limit is too low, the firm will avoid diversification, and the welfare of basic pharmaceutical consumers will not be improved.Generally, price control on basic pharmaceuticals will decrease the level of social welfare, while price control on high-price-quality pharmaceuticals can improve social welfare in some situations.This paper also explains some practical phenomenon of China’s price control in pharmaceutical industry, and makes relevant policy suggestions with respect to current regulation institutions.