从审计师成为客户高管:对旋转门现象的一项案例研究

From an Auditor to Being a Manager of Auditee:A Revolving Door Case in China

在安然事件等一系列公司丑闻后,审计师到审计客户担任高层管理人员的"旋转门"现象受到了更多的关注和监管。通过中国证券市场中审计师担任其上市客户财务高管的一则案例,本文考察了审计师与客户雇佣关系形成的过程以及形成前后的财务报告与审计特征,并重点探析了旋转门现象的前因。基于案例分析的证据显示,在审计师与客户形成雇佣关系之前存在着审计质量减损的若干迹象,从而可作为旋转门现象内在机理的一种解释。此外我们发现,在审计师与客户形成雇佣关系的过程中,以及雇佣关系形成之后的财务报告与审计特征,也都存在着若干异常表现。

Following a number of high profile corporate scandals such as Enron,the revolving door practice from an auditor to a manager of the audited client is more strictly regulated.There has been an emerging body of literature on the revolving door practice.However,most studies have focused on tests around the occurrence of the practice(particularly subsequent to the event),and have provided mixed results.Moreover,little has been known about the antecedents to the revolving door events and the mechanism of formation of such practices.Based on analyses of a typical revolving door case in China's stock market,we document evidence that suggests compromised audit quality prior to the revolving door event.We attribute such evidence as an interpretation of the formation of revolving door practice.Moreover,we also find some anomalies both during and after the process of revolving door practice.