经理管理防御假设下的企业融资决策研究

Analysis of Corporate Financing Decision under the Hypothesis of Managerial Entrenchment

通过将经理管理防御假设引入企业融资决策模型,建立了一个融资方式选择模型,模型分析得出企业股权融资偏好产生的又一基本原因是经理管理防御行为下的内生偏好。在经理和股东目标一致的情况下,经理会优先考虑利用股权融资来满足项目资金,除非经理有足够的理由相信项目的投资收益率足够大,才会选择债务融资;在经理管理防御的假设下,经理将最大限度地使用股权进行融资,直至在最大限度使用股权的状态下达到均衡。

By introducing the managerial entrenchment into the financing decision model,this paper develops a model of financing means choice.This paper thinks that the basic reason of the stock financing preference is the endogenous preference of managerial entrenchment.Provided that managers and shareholders have the same objective,managers will give priority to use equity financing to meet the project funding.Unless the manager has sufficient reason to believe that the project rate of return on investment is large enough,he will choose debt financing.Under the hypothesis of managerial entrenchment,managers will maximize the use of equity financing,until equilibrium is reached.