摘要
从柏拉图到蒯因,哲学家们提出各种方案证明"a=a"和"a=b"没有区分。这些证明尽管没有逻辑错误,但是违反经验,还是有瑕疵。弗雷格通过赋予语词意义和指称,试图证明"a=a"和"a=b"在认知意义上有区分;但是,由于弗雷格允许意义不同的语词可以有相同的指称,他的努力还是功亏一篑,"a=a"和"a=b"依然没有区分。有关同一性问题的讨论,尽管弗雷格的回答符合经验,但是不如柏拉图等人的回答在逻辑上完备,没有矛盾。这是一个很无奈的结局。
From Plato to Quine,philosophers presented different methods to prove "a=a" is not distinct from "a=b".Though these proofs are correct in logic, they bear flaw as being against experience.By endowing words with sense and reference,Frege managed to prove that there is distinction between "a=a" and "a=b".However,since it's possible for Frege to assign same reference to words with different senses,he finally failed to distinguish these two statements.In discussions about identity,though Frege's answer is in accord with experience,it's still inferior to Plato and other philosophers' answer which has no contradiction in logic.It's quite a dilemma.
出处
《大连海事大学学报(社会科学版)》
2010年第6期86-90,共5页
Journal of Dalian Maritime University(Social Science Edition)
关键词
弗雷格
分析陈述
综合陈述
意义
指称
Frege
analytical statement
synthetic statement
meaning
reference