资本约束下的银行资本调整与风险行为

Capital Adjustment and Risk Behavior of Commercial Banks under Regulatory Capital Discipline

本文研究了监管资本约束下的中国银行业的风险行为与资本调整策略,发现监管压力并不影响我国银行业的风险行为,但对其资本调整策略却产生了一定的影响。当银行逼近法定最低资本要求时,主要通过调增附属资本的方式来提高其资本充足水平;而当银行违背监管资本要求时,监管压力对其资本调整则没有显著的影响,这表明资本监管不一定能达到降低银行风险行为的目的。鉴于统一的监管制裁对不同类型和规模的银行有着不同程度的影响,当局有必要对其实施分类的资本监管,并研究分类监管制裁行动和手段的可行性与适当性。

The paper studies the risk behavior and capital adjustment strategy of China’s commercial banks under regulatory capital discipline.We find that the regulatory pressure doesn’t significantly affect the risk behavior of commercial banks.The regulatory pressure doesn’t affect the capital adjustment of the commercial banks which have already violated regulatory capital requirement.Whereas,the commercial banks which don’t violate the regulatory requirement but approach the regulatory threshold will react to the regulatory pressure by the means of fine-tuning affiliated capital to increase capital adequacy ratios.Our findings have two following implications.Firstly,capital regulatory does not always play the role of reducing the risk-taking behavior of commercial banks,because commercial banks which face the regulatory pressure don’t necessarily reduce risk assets to increase capital adequacy ratios,they also can utilize and manage capital instruments to meet the regulatory requirement.Secondly,the authorities should push and implement classified capital regulatory for banks with different styles and sizes,and study the feasibility and rationality of the actions and means of classified regulatory sanctions.