转型中的秩序与“二元治理结构”

The Orders in Transition and Dual-Governance Structure

在成功的市场经济中,个体在经济交往中是选择公共秩序还是选择私立秩序进行治理,大体上依赖于交易的信息条件所导致的交易成本。但是在转型经济中,受原权力集中型计划经济体系的持续影响,一个很重要的特征就是不同经济个体在使用公共秩序时的机会和成本是不对等的,即在转型经济体中公共秩序和私立秩序是相分离的二元治理结构。本文试图对这种二元结构的特征进行一个归纳和分析,并在此基础上提出转型的瓶颈问题,同时对中国在转型过程中的特殊性进行重点剖析。

In the successful market economy, the choosing of individuals between public order and private order to govern their economic interaction depends on the transaction costs with regard to the interaction. But in transitional economy, the opportunity and cost for different individual to access the same public order are not equal. That is to say, in transitional economy, public order and private order are separated, and formed in a dual - governance structure. This paper tries to analyze the dual - governance structure, in which we pay special attention to China＇ s instance.