摘要
制造商的生产能力受到限制时,单位产品生产成本会随产量的提高而增加;订货量增加时,零售商会尽力实现自己的销售目标,销售成本会增加,此情形下收益共享契约无法实现供应链的完美协调.鉴于此,通过对契约模型修订,研究发现单位产品生产成本增加时,制造商会提高批发价格,但会主动替零售商承担一部分递增的销售成本,且承担比例与其分享零售商销售收益份额成正比,此时可实现供应链的完美协调.数值分析验证了所得结论.
When the manufacturer's production capacity is limited, the unit production cost will increase with the increasing outputs. And with the increasing of order quantities, the retailer will do his best to meet sales targets, so the sale cost will increase. Under these conditions, the revenue sharing contract can not coordinate supply chain perfectly. Therefore, the contact model is modified, it is found that the manufacturer will increase the wholesale price with the unit product manufacturing cost increasing, but it will shares with the retailer the sale cost initiatively, and the relationship between the sharing ratio and the proportion of the retailer's revenue is positive correlation. Under this circumstance, the supply chain can be coordinated perfectly. Finally, a numerical example verifies the conclusions.
出处
《控制与决策》
EI
CSCD
北大核心
2011年第1期145-148,共4页
Control and Decision
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(70602017)
陕西省高校重点学科建设项目(107-00X902)
关键词
生产成本
销售成本
收益共享契约
供应链
production cost
sale cost
revenue sharing contract
supply chain