基于挣值的项目管理多业绩指标激励合同研究

A Study on Earned-value Based Multi-index Incentive Contracts of Project Management

应用EVM中两个基本业绩测度(计划差异和成本差异)建立一个多任务委托代理项目管理模型,并给出确定合同参数的计算方法。进一步,给出了最优激励强度之间的关系:当代理人两种努力相互替代(互补,独立)时,相应的激励强度之间也存在着替代(互补,独立)关系。最后,分析了外生参数的变化对这种替代(互补)关系中的替代(互补)程度的影响。结果表明,最优激励强度之间的替代(互补)程度随着代理人努力之间的替代(互补)程度、代理人风险规避程度和代理人用于降低实际成本努力的边际相对风险的增加而增加,但随着代理人用于提高挣值的努力的边际相对风险的增加而减小。

Using two basic performance measures（i.e.schedule variance and cost variance） in the EVM system,this paper builds a multi-task principal-agent model for project management,and provides an approach to calculate the contract parameters.Further,it gives the relationship between the incentive intensities for different kinds of efforts： when the agent＇s efforts are substitutes（complements）,the corresponding relationship between incentive intensities is substituting（complementary）.Finally,it analyzes the impacts of exogenous parameters on the degree of substitution（complementarity）.The result shows that the degree of substitution（complementarity） increases as the degrees of the agent＇s substitution（complementarity） between two kinds of efforts,the magnitude of his/her risk aversion,and the marginal relative risk of his/her efforts to reduce the actual costs of the project increase,but decreases as the marginal relative risk of his/her efforts to raise the earned value of the project increases.