企业跨国上市与公司治理——基于“绑定假说”的最新证据

Cross Listing and Corporate Governance——The Newest Evidences Based on "Bonding Hypothesis"

企业跨国上市的动机除了财务和商业方面的利益外,最新研究表明公司治理动机的解释最具说服力。本文详细分析了"绑定"假说在理论上和实证上的应用,结论表明严格的监管和法律环境,以及企业不再掠夺小股东的承诺,有利于提高公司的治理水平和价值,或者企业会在上市之前加强公司治理,显现"门槛效应",最后本文讨论了开展跨国上市研究对中国的实践意义及未来的研究方向。

The lated researches show that corporate governance,among the motivations which enterprises engage cross-listing besids financial and commercial profits,is the most persuasion. The paper analyzes the applicationof the ＂bonding hypothesis＂ in theoretical and practical fields,and draws a conclution that strict regulation,legal entironment and promises which enterprises don’t plunder small shareholders are beneficial for companies to boost their governance level and their values. Or enterprises will reinforce their governance before they engage cross-listing,which shows ＂threshold effect＂. At last,the paper discusses that carrying out studies on cross-listing will bring practical significances to China and our future studying orientation.