国际贸易组织对社会规章影响模型——基于欧美农业多功能性视角

Theoretical Model That International Trade Institutions Impact on Social Regulations——Example of Agricultural Multifunctionality of USA and EU

文章发展了一个国际贸易组织对国内规章影响的动态模型,并用以验证欧盟和美国的农业多功能性政策,得出如下结论:虽然国际贸易组织可以促成"虚假"规章的无效,但其也可能促使居民放松国内限制来间接增加规章。如果总效应是增加的,则导致规章下降,长期中可以通过降低规章保护来弱化利益集团,缓和负外部性。这种正强化对前次选择"酌情"规则的国家有利,比如欧盟;如果总效应导致规章增加,长期中则表明强化利益集团,加大负外部性。这种负强化对应前次选择"限制"规则的国家,比如美国。

This article develops a model of domestic regulation under international trade institutions,and uses it to verify the Agricultutural multifunctionality of USA and EU,then draws a conclusion：international trade institution can invalidate spurious regulation,but it may also increase regulation by inducing citizens to dismantle domestic institutional constraints on it. If the total effect is a reduction in regulation,international trade institutions will weaken special interests and mitigate negative externality in the long run. This positive reinforcement benefits societies such as EU that has previously chosen discretion rule. But if the total effect is an expansion of regulation,international trade institutions could increase regulatory protection,strengthen special interests and reinforce negative exernality. This negative reinforcement is correspondent to societies such as USA that has previously chosen constraining rule.