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激励相容视角下DIS的制度成本思考

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摘要 存款保险制度(DIS)中的常常存在基于信息不对称导致其设计过程中产生的激励不相容问题。文章基于市场约束减弱问题、逆向选择和道德风险三方面制度成本,探讨了未来我国设立存款保险制度如何避免由于激励不相容产生的制度成本。
作者 王先福
出处 《法制与经济》 2010年第24期124-125,共2页
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