不完全税权、政府竞争与税收增长

Incomplete Tax Rights,Intergovernmental Competition and Tax Growth

本文在一个同时包含了政府间横向和纵向竞争的框架内分析了中国税收增长路径的内生决定机制。在名义税率不变，但存在较大征管空间的情况下，横向竞争倾向于压低实际均衡税率，纵向竞争则恰恰相反。分税制改革以来的税权向上集中趋势，以及中央对地方财政收入的规范化进程等因素，使得纵向竞争效应趋强，横向竞争效应相对趋弱，最终体现为十几年的税收持续超经济增长。当前，减税以及相关的分权、分税体制改革可作为增进社会福利的备选方案。

This paper explores the mechanism of Chinas tax growth within a framework of intergovernmental competition. Tax Competition takes place through endogenous tax collecting efficiency. Horizontal competition tends to lower the effective equilibrium tax rate,while vertical competition has the reverse effect. Since the 1993 tax reform, concentration of tax revenue to upper-level governments and regulation of local public finance imposed by the central government, have led to stronger vertical effects and relatively weaker horizontal effects. The paper offers us not only a new perspective to understand Chinas fiscal decentralization, but also an efficiency principle to design optimal tax sharing system.