摘要
本文研究了同质产品市场中产量匹配惩罚策略下的默契合谋。我们得到的结论如下:(1)同质市场中的默契合谋是可能的;(2)垄断产量不可能通过合谋实现;(3)与纳什回归惩罚策略相比,合谋有可能更加困难,也有可能同等容易。我们将得到的结论与Luand Wright(2010)所研究的价格匹配惩罚策略下的默契合谋进行了比较,并给出了一个线性需求函数的例子。
This paper investigates the tacit collusion with quantity-matching punishments in a market with homogeneous goods. The findings are the following: (1) Tacit collusion can arise with quantity-matching punishments; (2) Monopoly output quantity cannot be supported by quantity-matching punishment strategy; (3) Compared with the Nash-reversion strategy, collusion is not easier to sustain, but not necessarily harder. Our results are compared with those in Lu and Wright (2010) with price-matching punishments. We also provide an example with linear demand to illustrate the theory.
出处
《经济学(季刊)》
2010年第4期169-182,共14页
China Economic Quarterly