同质市场中产量匹配惩罚策略下的默契合谋被引量：2

Tacit Collusion with Quantity-Matching Punishments in a Homogeneous Market

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摘要本文研究了同质产品市场中产量匹配惩罚策略下的默契合谋。我们得到的结论如下：（1）同质市场中的默契合谋是可能的；（2）垄断产量不可能通过合谋实现；（3）与纳什回归惩罚策略相比，合谋有可能更加困难，也有可能同等容易。我们将得到的结论与Luand Wright（2010）所研究的价格匹配惩罚策略下的默契合谋进行了比较，并给出了一个线性需求函数的例子。 This paper investigates the tacit collusion with quantity-matching punishments in a market with homogeneous goods. The findings are the following：（1） Tacit collusion can arise with quantity-matching punishments; （2） Monopoly output quantity cannot be supported by quantity-matching punishment strategy; （3） Compared with the Nash-reversion strategy, collusion is not easier to sustain, but not necessarily harder. Our results are compared with those in Lu and Wright （2010） with price-matching punishments. We also provide an example with linear demand to illustrate the theory.

作者卢远瞩

机构地区中央财经大学中国经济与管理研究院

出处《经济学（季刊）》 2010年第4期169-182,共14页 China Economic Quarterly

关键词产量匹配惩罚策略默契合谋跨期反应函数

分类号 F714 [经济管理—产业经济]

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参考文献16

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