首位晋升与末位淘汰机制的实验比较

An Experimental Comparison between Winner-up and Loser-out Tournaments

本文采用实验经济学中的比较制度实验方法，对首位晋升制和末位淘汰制两种团队激励机制进行了比较。首先，在构建了基本模型的基础上，我们推导出了与首位晋升制和末位淘汰制效率对比相关的三个重要命题；其次，围绕这三个命题，我们又提出了三个实验假设并设计了三组比较制度实验；最后，实验结果表明，团队个体的风险选择行为和能力分布特征等因素对于两种机制的优劣比较具有重要的影响。该研究结论对于团队成员的激励设计具有重要的指导意义。

In this paper we compare two incentive mechanisms for team work, the win- ner-up tournament and the loser-out tournament, through experiments. We first derive three propositions concerning the comparison of the performances of the two mechanisms. Then we propose three experimental hypotheses according to the propositions, and design three ses- sions of experiments. The experiments suggest that the risk attitude and ability distribution of team members have important effects on the performances of the two mechanisms.