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归纳悖论的方法论研究探纲 被引量:2

The Methodological Research of Inductive Paradoxes
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摘要 通过考察确证悖论、绿蓝悖论和彩票悖论的演进过程,揭示它们是一个有着内在逻辑-历史关联的悖论家族,是信念合理接受难题家族在不同层面的具体展现;在对三大悖论构成要素进行分析的基础上,指认归纳悖论语用的知识论悖论本体地位,并明确界说归纳悖论;指出了当前归纳悖论研究的整体趋向。 By investigating the evolving process of confirmation paradox,grue paradox and lottery paradox,it can be found that the three paradoxes are the logical-historical related members of a paradox family and that they are actually the emergence of a belief rational acceptance puzzle on different levels.On the basis of analyzing elements of the three paradoxes,it is shown that inductive paradoxes are epistemological ones,and the inductive paradox is defined uniquely.Finaly,the trends of inductive paradox research are discussed.
作者 顿新国
出处 《自然辩证法通讯》 CSSCI 北大核心 2010年第6期14-18,共5页 Journal of Dialectics of Nature
基金 作者主持的教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目"确证理论及其语用趋向与应用研究"(08JC720006) 江苏省社科基金项目"形式知识论研究"(10ZXC009)的阶段性成果之一
关键词 归纳悖论 知识论悖论 方法论研究 Inductive paradoxes Epistemological paradoxes Methodological research
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参考文献22

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同被引文献15

  • 1Kyburg H. Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief[ M]. Middletown : Wesleyan University Press, 1961 : 197.
  • 2凯伯格.概率,合理性和分离规则[C]//江天骥.科学哲学名著选读.武汉:湖北人民出版社,1988:338-350.
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  • 8Jean Nicod. Foundation of Georrvztry and Induction. Lon- don: Routledge, 1930. p.219.
  • 9W.V.Quine. Natural Kinds. In Douglas Stalker(eds.).Grue! The New Riddle of Induction. Chicago: Open Court, 1994. pp.41- 56.
  • 10Nelson Goodman. Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. Cambridge: Harvard University, 1954. p.74.

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