公司丑闻、声誉机制与高管变更

Corporate Scandals,Reputation Mechanism and Management Turnover

本文以2003～2008年发生丑闻的公司高管为研究样本,实证检验了作为非正式制度约束的声誉机制对高管变更的影响。模型的回归结果显示,公司业绩、董事会特征以及股权集中度并不能有效解释丑闻公司高管变更的原因。相反,声誉惩罚却显著提高了丑闻公司高管变更概率,并分别将这些公司董事长和总经理变更的概率至少提高了8.02个百分点和2.46个百分点。进一步研究还表明,声誉惩罚显著降低了丑闻公司董事长变更后继续担任公司其他职位的概率。研究结论证实,在转型期的中国,作为非正式制度约束的声誉机制能够在改善公司治理方面发挥作用。

Using data from 2003 to 2008, this paper empirically studies the effect of the reputation mechanism as an informal institution on the management turnover. We could not find evidence that the firm performance, board size and ownership concentration influence the managers＇ departure in companies which break out scandals. But we find that reputational penalty significantly increases the turnover of chairman and CEO. Besides that, the reputa- tional penalty respectively increases the probability of chairman and CEO turnover at least 8.02 percent and 2.46 percent. Further results suggest that reputational penalty remarkable decrease the opportunity that chairman gets other position after they were turn over in the companies. The conclusion means that reputation mechanism can significantly improve corporate governance in transition countries like China.