我国商业银行债权在上市公司治理中的效应

An Empirical Research on Governance of Chinese Banking Claims

本文对我国银行在上市公司发挥公司治理作用的机制和途径进行了理论和实证研究。研究结果表明,我国银行债权对上市公司的治理力度很弱。银行贷款无论期限长短,治理总体效应都为负,体现为对公司绩效的影响都是显著的负相关关系。在治理机制的途径上,无论是短期贷款还是长期贷款,与公司管理成本费用率之间都是正相关关系,长期贷款与自由现金流量之间显著负相关;这说明银行的长期债权能发挥一定的监督作用,但由于长期贷款占比少,银行债权不能有效约束经理人。公司规模与公司绩效、自由现金流和管理成本费用率之间有显著的合理相关性。

The corporate governance of commercial banks has a very important role in listed companies. In this paper, the theoretical and empirical research of banks in the listed companies to play a role in corporate governance mechanisms and channels in China. The results show that： China＇s banking creditors of the intensity of weak governance of listed companies. Term bank loans, regardless of the length of the overall effects of treatment were negative, reflected the impact on corporate performance is a significant negative correlation. In the governance mechanisms of the pathway, whether it is short-term loans or long-term loans, and corporate governance costs are positive correlation between the rate of long-term loans and free cash flow, a significant negative correlation between, indicating the long-term bank debt is able to perform the supervision role, but in the long-term loans accounted for less, bank debt can not be effectively bound by managers. Company size and corporate performance, free cash flow and management costs significantly between the rate of a reasonable correlation.