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法定央行独立性的反通胀效应及其影响因素——基于现有研究文献的分析 被引量:8

The Anti-inflation Effects of Legal Central Bank's Independence and its Determining Factors
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摘要 本文阐述了法定央行独立性通过提高货币政策可信度进而发挥反通货膨胀效应的作用机理,在对现有关于法定央行独立性反通胀效应的相关研究文献进行分析的基础上,讨论了支持这种效应的现有经验证据的可信性,进一步分析了司法独立性、政治制度特征、金融基础结构和社会文化环境等因素对央行法定独立性反通胀效应的制约作用。一些发展中国家和转型国家法定央行独立性的反通胀效应不显著就与这些因素有关。 The paper provides a survey of the anti-inflation effect of the central-bank's independence through building credibility of monetary policy,analyses the correlative experimental evidence,assesses the credibility of these evidences,and makes further analysis on the determining factors on the effectiveness of legal independence of the central bank.These factors include judicial independence,characteristics of the political system and financial system,and historical environment.
作者 何运信
出处 《财经论丛》 CSSCI 北大核心 2011年第1期48-54,共7页 Collected Essays on Finance and Economics
基金 教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金资助项目(09YJC790236) 浙江省哲学社会科学规划青年基金资助项目(09CGJJ006YBQ)
关键词 货币政策可信度 法定央行独立性 政治基础结构 金融基础结构 credibility of monetary policy legal independence of central bank political infrastructure financial infrastructure
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参考文献21

  • 1Posen, A. Central Bank Independence and Disinflation Credibility: a Missing Link [R]. Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports , May 1995.
  • 2卡尔·E·沃.什.货币理论与政策(第二版)[M].周继忠译.上海:上海财经大学出版社,2004.
  • 3Blinder, A. S. Central-Bank Credibility; Why Do We Care? How Do We Build It? [J]. the American Economic Review, 2000, 90 (5) : 1421 - 1431.
  • 4Waller, S. and J. De Haan. Credibility and Transparency of Central Banks: New Results Based on IFO'S World Economic Survey [R]. CESifo Working Paper No. 119, May. 2004.
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  • 6Keefer, P., Stasavage, D. The limits of delegation: Veto players, central bank independence and the credibility of monetary policy [J]. American Political Science Review, 2003, 97: 407- 423.
  • 7Debelle, G. and S. Fischer. How Independent Should a Central Bank Be? [C]. In J. C. Fuhrer (Ed.), "Goals, Guidelines and Constraints Facing Monetary Policymakers', Boston: Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 1994.
  • 8Hayo, B. and C. Hefeker. Does Central Bank Independence Cause Low Inflation? A Sceptical View [R]. "Paolo Baffi" Centre Research Paper Series, No. 2008- 04.
  • 9[美]弗雷德里克·米什金,斯坦利·埃金斯.金融市场与金融机构[M].北京:北京大学出版社,2006.
  • 10Martijn, J. K., and H. Samiei. Central Bank Independence and the Conduct of Monetary Policy in the United Kingdom [R]. IMF Working Paper 99/170, December, 1999.

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