摘要
本文以社会福利为衡量保险市场效率的标准,分析了在处于R-S均衡的保险市场中,如果有部分投保人低估自身风险,实施强制保险是否有助于保险市场效率的提高。作者首先证明了在存在逆选择现象的保险市场上,若有部分低风险投保人低估自身风险,则会使市场效率下降;然后通过比较实施强制保险前后社会福利的差异,得出结论:实施强制保险有助于社会福利的改善,从而可以提高保险市场效率。
Using social welfare as an index of market efficiency,the paper tries to analyze whether compulsory insurance can improve efficiency of the insurance market in R-S equilibrium with misinformation.At first,it testifies that the insurance market with adverse selection is a market with malfunction if the low-risk insured underestimates the risk;and then compares differences of the social welfare before and after implementing compulsory insurance.The paper shows that compulsory insurance can contribute to improving social welfare,and consequently improves market efficiency.
出处
《财经论丛》
CSSCI
北大核心
2011年第1期62-69,共8页
Collected Essays on Finance and Economics
关键词
信息不对称
信息不准确
强制保险
社会福利
市场效率
information asymmetry
misinformation
compulsory insurance
social welfare
market efficiency