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强制保险对提高市场效率的作用研究——基于对信息不准确保险市场的分析

Study of Compulsory Insurance in Improving Market Efficiency——Based on Analyzing the Misinformation in Insurance Market
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摘要 本文以社会福利为衡量保险市场效率的标准,分析了在处于R-S均衡的保险市场中,如果有部分投保人低估自身风险,实施强制保险是否有助于保险市场效率的提高。作者首先证明了在存在逆选择现象的保险市场上,若有部分低风险投保人低估自身风险,则会使市场效率下降;然后通过比较实施强制保险前后社会福利的差异,得出结论:实施强制保险有助于社会福利的改善,从而可以提高保险市场效率。 Using social welfare as an index of market efficiency,the paper tries to analyze whether compulsory insurance can improve efficiency of the insurance market in R-S equilibrium with misinformation.At first,it testifies that the insurance market with adverse selection is a market with malfunction if the low-risk insured underestimates the risk;and then compares differences of the social welfare before and after implementing compulsory insurance.The paper shows that compulsory insurance can contribute to improving social welfare,and consequently improves market efficiency.
作者 周海珍
出处 《财经论丛》 CSSCI 北大核心 2011年第1期62-69,共8页 Collected Essays on Finance and Economics
关键词 信息不对称 信息不准确 强制保险 社会福利 市场效率 information asymmetry misinformation compulsory insurance social welfare market efficiency
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参考文献11

  • 1Kleindorfer, P. R., Kunreuther, H., Misinformation and Equilibrium in Insurance Markets [ G], J? rg Finsinger, Economic Analysis of Regulated Markets, London and Basingstoke: the Macmillan Press LTD, 1983, 67- 90.
  • 2Pauly, M. V., Overinsurance and Public Provision of insurance: the Role of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection [J], The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1974, 88 (1) : 44 - 62.
  • 3Pauly, M. V., Overinsurance and Public Provision of insurance: Comment [J], The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1978, 92 (4) : 693 - 696.
  • 4Johnson, W. R., Choice of Compulsory Insurance Schemes under Adverse Selection [J], Public Choice, 1977, 31 : 23 - 36.
  • 5Dahlby, B. G., Adverse Selection and Pareto Improvements through Compulsory Insurance [J], Public Choice, 1981, 37 (3) : 547 - 559.
  • 6Lereah, D. A., Information Problems Regulation in Insurance Markets [D], University of Virginia, 1983.
  • 7周海珍,陈秉正.强制保险能否提高保险市场效率分析[J].保险研究,2009(4):19-23. 被引量:11
  • 8Sandroni, A., Squintani, F., the Overconfidence Problem in Insurance Markets, Working paper, 2004.
  • 9Rothschild, M., Stiglitz, J. E., Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: The Economics of Markets with Imperfect Information [J], Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1976, (90) : 629 - 650.
  • 10Wilson, C., A Model of Insurance Markets with Incomplete Information [J], Journal of Economic Theory, 1977, (12): 167 -207.

二级参考文献8

  • 1Dahlby B. G. , 1981, "Adverse Selection and Pareto Improvements through Compulsory Insurance", Public Choice, Vol. 37, No. 3, PP 547 -559.
  • 2Johnson W. R. , 1977," Choice of Compulsory Insurance Schemes under Adverse Selection", Public Choice, Vol. 31, Fall, PP 23 - 36.
  • 3Lereah D. A. , 1983, Information Problems Regulation in Insurance Markets, University of Virginia.
  • 4Pauly M. V. , 1974, Overinsurance and Public Provision of insurance: the Role of Moral Hazard and Ad- verse Selection, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 88, No. 1, PP 44 - 62.
  • 5Pauly M. V. , 1978, Overinsurance and Public Provision of insurance : Comment, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 92, No. 4, PP 693 -696.
  • 6Rothschild M. , Stiglitz J. E. , 1976, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: The Economics of Markets with Imperfect Information, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 90, No. 4, PP 629 - 649.
  • 7Spence, M. , 1978, "Product Differentiation and Performance in Insurance Markets", Journal of Public Economics, 10, PP 427 -477.
  • 8Wilson C. , 1977,"A Model of Insurance Markets with Incomplete Information", Journal of Economic Theory, 12, PP 167-207.

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