政府技术采购的权力寻租模型及规制措施

The Power Rent-Seeking Model and the Regulation Measurements of the Government Technology Procurement

政府技术采购作为一项公共政策工具,能够极大地推动技术创新。基于经济人动机,政府技术采购领域不可避免地存在权力租金交易。借助委托-代理理论,构建了政府技术采购的权力寻租模型。权力寻租可能带来种种社会危害,如破坏社会的生产力水平、降低公众的福利水平、导致科研单位的X-低效率。为最大限度地降低政府技术采购领域中权力寻租的规模和概率,有必要明确政府管理部门的角色定位、建立租金的消散机制、实行高薪养廉与预防寻租相结合的机制、完善对权力寻租行为的监督机制和加大对租金交易的惩罚力度。

As an effective public policy,government technology procurement can drive technology innovation greatly.Based on the motive of economic man,power rent transactions exist inevitably in the area of government technology procurement.This paper constructs the model of power rent seeking with the help of principal-agent theory.Power rent seeking can bring about kinds of social harms,such as destructing the social productive level,lowering the public benefit level,causing the X low efficiency of the scientific research units.In order to minimize the size and possibility of the power rent seeking,it is necessary to clarify the roles of the government authorities,construct the rent dissipation mechanism,carry out the mechanism of combing the policy of high pay to discourage corruption with prevention measurements,perfect the supervision mechanism of rent-seeking behaviors,and strengthen the punishment of rent trading.