境外战略投资者改变了国有商业银行的贷款行为吗——基于动态面板数据模型的经验分析

Do Foreign Strategic Investors Change the Lending Behavior of State-owned Commercial Banks?——An Empirical Analysis Based on Dynamic Panel Data Model

本文利用中国商业银行2002～2007年省级面板数据,从贷款行为的视角研究了引进境外战略投资者对国有商业银行的影响。运用动态面板系统广义矩估计方法,本文的计量结果显示,国有商业银行与其他商业银行的贷款行为存在着明显的差别,国有商业银行贷款增长率与盈利能力呈负相关,而其他商业银行贷款增长率与盈利能力显著正相关,这说明与国有商业银行相比,其他商业银行贷款行为更符合商业导向;引进境外战略投资者并没有带来了国有商业银行整体贷款行为的显著改善,对引资国有商业银行个体贷款行为的分析结论与之类似。本文的结论对制定中国银行业下一步改革方向具有重要的启发意义。

By using provincial panel data for Chinese commercial banks through 2002-2007,this paper studies the impact of introducing Foreign Strategic Investors(FSI) on the lending behavior of state-owned commercial banks.We conduct the system generalized method of moments(SYS-GMM) estimation within the lending growth framework.The results show that the lending behavior between state-owned commercial banks and other banks is significantly different.Specifically,lending growth of state-owned commercial banks is negatively related to profitability while such relationship is positive for other commercial banks,implying that the lending behavior of the latter is more likely to be commercial oriented.Besides,introducing FSI improves the overall lending behavior of state-owned commercial banks;however,this positive effect is not significant.The conclusions have important policy-making implications for China bank reform.