管理层异质性与管理层薪酬契约效率

Management Heterogeneity and Compensation Contracts of the Management

以管理层异质性作为概念基础,对管理层薪酬契约的决定效率和激励效率实施了联合检验。研究表明,董事与高管之间的"合谋"使我国上市公司管理层薪酬契约更多地满足了董事与高管的个人偏好而不是股东价值的最大化,董事与高管以超额薪酬方式共同分享"企业租金"的行为导致管理层薪酬契约偏离了最优契约标准。此外,董事与高管"合谋"对管理层薪酬契约效率的消极影响在国有上市公司进一步恶化,并随着第一大股东持股比例的上升有所弱化。

Based on the concept of management heterogeneity,this paper tests the efficiency with which managerial compensation contracts resolve the agency problem in listed companies.Empirical results suggest that managerial compensation contracts satisfy the private preferences of directors and executive much more than maximizing shareholder＇s value because of the coalition between directors and executives.It is the sharing of economic rent of the enterprise between directors and executive drives managerial compensation contracts to deviate from optimal contract standards.Furthermore,the negative effect of coalition between directors and executive on the efficiency of managerial compensation contracts become more serious in SOE,but less serious with increase of the holdings of the first shareholder.