债务融资结构对企业投资行为的影响被引量：30

The Impact of Debt Structure on the Investment Behavior

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摘要代理成本理论认为不同的债务融资结构对投资行为有着不同的影响，进而影响代理成本的高低，主要表现在对过度投资和投资不足的约束方面。本文通过对上市公司投资行为的分析，识别出过度投资、投资不足和正常投资行为，并深入研究不同债务融资结构对具体投资行为的影响。研究发现，债务类型结构中银行借款不能抑制过度投资和投资不足，债务期限结构中长期借款推动过度投资而短期借款抑制过度投资和投资不足的作用较弱，并不支持代理成本理论。 The agency theory indicates that different debt structures have different influence on enterprise investment behavior and then impact the decreased degree of agency cost,which are showed in inhibiting the overinvestment and underinvestment mainly.Through the analysis of investment of the listed companies in China,we identify the overinvestment,underinvestment and normal investment and further research the impact of debt structure on concrete investment.The research shows that bank loan can't inhibit the overinvestment and the underinvestment in debt type structure,the long-term loan prompt the overinvestment and short-term loan inhibit the overinvestment and the underinvestment weakly,which show that debt structure can't support the agency theory.

作者谢海洋董黎明

机构地区中南财经政法大学会计学院浙江财经学院会计学院

出处《中南财经政法大学学报》 CSSCI 北大核心 2011年第1期92-96,143-144,共5页 Journal of Zhongnan University of Economics and Law

关键词债务融资结构投资行为过度投资代理成本 Debt Structure Investment Behavior Overinvestment Agency Cost

分类号 F270.3 [经济管理—企业管理]

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参考文献10

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