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不完全契约理论的转变 被引量:26

Changes in the Theory of Incomplete Contract
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摘要 本文概括了第一代不完全契约理论存在的三个问题:理论基础不坚实,过于依赖专用性投资,难以解释授权问题。具体地,本文介绍了国际经济学界关于不完全契约理论基础的争论。这些挑战导致行为经济学和实验经济学因素的引入,从而初步构建了以参照点效应为基础的第二代不完全契约理论。作者展望了不完全契约理论的研究议题及其在中国的应用前景。 The paper generalized three defects of the first version of the incomplete contract theory,namely,not well-grounded theoretical foundation,too much reliance on specific investment,and inability to explain authorization.The controversies among the academics in the world over the theoretical foundation of the incomplete contract theory were introduced.The paper pointed out that these controversial views had led to the induction of elements of behavior economics and experimental economics.Thus,the second version of the theory was established on the basis of the reference point effect.At the end of the paper,research topics concerning this theory were suggested and application prospects of this theory in China were predicted.
作者 聂辉华
出处 《教学与研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2011年第1期71-78,共8页 Teaching and Research
基金 “全国优秀博士学位论文作者专项课题”(No.200903);“北京地区普通高等学校首都经济学科群建设项目(2010-2012)”的资助。
关键词 不完全契约 产权 参照点 行为经济学 incomplete contract property reference point behavior economics
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