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良种补贴政策的动因与制约因素探讨——基于水稻作物的实证分析 被引量:8

Motivation and constraints of seed-subsidy policy:an empirical study of rice
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摘要 良种补贴政策施行过程中的主要行为主体是政府部门、农民,还有政府官员及供种工作人员,对该政策的制度设计进行多方多阶段博弈分析,结果表明良种补贴政策在相关约束条件成立的前提下,是可以实现有效均衡的。通过进一步分析相关制约因素发现,在水稻生产函数模型中良种补贴这一政策变量对产量起正向作用(P<0.05),但补贴额度、补贴的对象和方式等方面的限制条件在政策设计之初并未很好地解决。从机制设计角度探讨其根源可以发现,衡量一项公共政策的效率标准首先是必须实现各方参与者的激励相容,而良种补贴政策的实现方式无论对农户和政策执行者都缺乏有效的激励,最终导致政府干预经济效率低下和社会福利损失。 The executants in implementing seed-subsidy policy includes government,farmers,government officials as well as staff of seed companies.The results of the game-model analysis on the policy′s institutional deaign shows that an effective balance can be achieved under the seed subsidy if the relevant constraints are established.Through analyzing the constraints,it is found that the variable of subsidy plays a positive role in production in the rice production function model(P0.05),and that the constraints such as the limit,target and method of subsidy were not well defined at the beginning of policy making.The result of analyzing the root of the problem from the perspective of policy design shows that the efficiency standard for measuring a public policy is first of all the incentive compatibility on the part of all participants and that such an effective incentive is lacking for both farmers and policy makers,which results in government intervention and the loss of social welfare.
作者 陈东平 丁筱
出处 《南京农业大学学报》 CAS CSCD 北大核心 2011年第1期137-142,共6页 Journal of Nanjing Agricultural University
关键词 良种补贴 博弈模型 制约因素 激励相容 seed-subsidy game model constraints incentive compatibility
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