韩国财阀改革的政治经济学:以小股东运动为例

The Political Economics of Chaebol Reform in South Korea--with the Example of the Minority Shareholder's Campaign

正如自由放任非自然形成,韩国财阀的形成也是一个政治的产物。除了政府的金融和产业等政策支持,不少韩国财阀直接源自韩国国有企业和公共资产的贱价私有化。以财阀为中心的经济增长也成为了当下韩国资本主义的不稳定力量之源。为了拯救处于困境中的韩国财阀资本主义,作为一种社会运动和公司治理的方式,股东积极主义被引介到韩国。过去十多年里,韩国小股东运动在抵制财阀力量扩张、改善公司治理、促进经济民主等方面取得了一些成就,但也面临着不少挑战。处于十字路口的小股东运动及财阀改革是理解当下韩国资本主义的极好注脚。

Just as laissez-faire economy is not naturally formed, the Korean chaebol is not naturally formed, either, but a product of politics. Besides the support from the government＇s financial and industrial policies, quite a number of Korean chaebols owe their origination directly from the underselling of state-owned companies and other public assets. Chaebol-centered economic growth has become a destabilizing force. In order to deliver chaebol capitalism out of its current predicament, shareholder activism has been introduced into Korea as a social movement and a way of corporate governance. Over the past ten years or so, minority shareholder＇s campaign in Korea has played an active role in protecting the interests oi minority shareholders, resisting the expansion of chaebol power, and promoting economic democratization. At the same time, there have been serious challenges. The minority shareholder＇s campaign and chaebol reform, which are now in a critical junction, have provided a good footnote for our understanding of Korea＇s present-clay capitalism.