概念语义与弗雷格迷题消解

Concept-Semantics and A Resolution of Frege's Puzzle

弗雷格因同一替换律讨论而提出了涵义与指称的理论,这个理论后来引出了弗雷格迷题。弗雷格迷题的形成有多方原因,直接指称论对弗雷格理论批评是主要原因之一,以至于可以说,这是产生于直接指称论哲学立场的迷题。尽管如此,弗雷格理论确有不足。最重要的是,弗雷格理论只有关于涵义与指称的理论,即只有语言层面的理论,而缺少认知层面的理论。这个不足使得在弗雷格理论基础上解决同一替换律问题难有令人满意的结果,让"迷题"多添了几分"迷"的色彩。这里将给出一个新的方案:在弗雷格理论的基础上,增加有关概念的理论,以概念和内涵、涵义等这些概念的形式刻画为中心,建立可以消解弗雷格迷题的形式语义学,即概念语义。通过概念语义可以在不同层次上对弗雷格迷题的消解给出统一回答。

Frege＇s discussion of the Principle of Identity Substitution（PIS） led him to his theory of sense and reference,where Frege＇s puzzle was introduced.According to the main criticisms of Frege＇s theory,the puzzle is rooted in the philosophical position based on the direct reference theory.Therefore we may say that this is a puzzle for the direct reference theory.However,Frege＇s theory is indeed insufficient to resolve this puzzle. Most importantly,Frege＇s theory only talks about sense and reference,namely only the language layer,lacking a theory of the cognitive layer.This makes it hard to solve the problem of PIS on a theoretical basis.Since Frege＇s puzzle was introduced by PIS,a satisfactory solution to the puzzle asks for a treatment of the failure of this principle on the logical layer.In the possible-worlds semantics,PIS can take several different forms：A a=b→K→a（a=b）,B.M a=b→M K_a（a=b）,and C. a=b Ka（a=b）.The possible-worlds semantics can explain the failure of A but not the failures of B and C.Although the origin of the puzzle was due to PIS, the solution to the puzzle should not only focus on this principle.In this paper,a new solution to Frege＇s puzzle is given：based on Frege＇s theory of sense and reference,by adding a concept theory and focusing on the formalization of concept,intension and sense,a new semantics,namely concept-semantics,is established,in which we can talk about the puzzle on these different layers. Concept-semantics has a two-layer structure：the underlying layer is the structure of sense-semantics based on the public meaning of the language in use;on this basis,by adding individual cognitive aspects,we can characterize knowledge and obtain the structure of concept-semantics.Sense-semantics focuses on the relationship between sense and reference while concept-semantics is used to resolve Frege＇s puzzle on the cognitive and logical aspects.This two-layer structure reflects,in formal semantics,the extension of Frege＇s original theory to a theory of concepts.The interaction between the language layer and the cognitive layer involved in the puzzle is the key to such a formal semantics. The invalidity of PIS in logic should be a natural consequence of suitable characterizations of concept,intension,and sense.In this light,concept-semantics uniformly solves Frege＇s puzzle on the different layers.