基于委托代理理论的企业投资研究综述

A Literature Review of Corporation Investment Based on Agent Theory

在简要评述新古典框架下的企业投资理论及其局限性基础上,从股东与管理者、股东与债权人和自由现金流三个代理冲突方面,对传统委托代理下的企业投资理论基础、作用机制和经验结论进行了评述和阐释。进而沿着公司治理研究的发展动态,对大小股东代理冲突和大股东私有利益驱动下的企业投资最新研究成果进行了梳理和归纳。最后立足于我国上市公司特定的治理结构,提出了进一步探索与规范企业投资行为的研究方向。

Based on reviewing the narrow of corporation investment theory under new classic economics,this paper firstly review and explain the theory foundation,analysis frame and mechanism of corporation investment from shareholder-manager,shareholder-creditor and free cash flow under the traditional agent confliction.Along with the current development of corporation governance,the literature review has been given about the corporation investment driven by the private benefit of control under agent conflicts in controlled shareholders.At last,the paper points out the future direction of research in corporation investment and governance efficiency improvement under the governance structure of Chinese listed companies.