监管机构间博弈的金融监管非均衡与系统风险研究

The Disequilibrium of Financial Supervision and Systemic Risk Based on the Games of Financial Supervisors

文章通过对金融监管者之间的博弈行为研究发现,分业监管体制下监管机构之间的监管合作成本是导致监管制度漏洞的重要因素。以金融监管机构之间博弈为基础的监管者与金融机构的博弈结果显示,监管者可以通过对监管成本和处罚力度的动态调整实现监管博弈均衡。监管制度的均衡分析与微观形成机理结论的契合表明,降低监管成本比单纯加大对金融机构的处罚力度更有利于金融系统性风险的控制与化解。通过对美国应对2008年全球金融危机的金融监管实践分析和我国金融监管现状透视,模型结论得到了有效的印证。

By the research on game behavior of financial supervisors, this paper indicates that cooperation costs between supervision institutions under sub-sector supervision system become an important reason for the loopholes of supervision system. The game result between supervisors and participators reveals that supervisors achieve the equilibrium of supervision game by the dynamic adjustment of supervision costs and punishment level. The equilibrium analysis of supervision system meets the conclusion of micro formation mechanism, which shows that, in comparison with the pure increase in penalties for financial institutions, the reduction in supervision costs is more beneficial to the control of financial systemic risk. The analysis of U. S. financial supervision activities responding to the global financial cri sis in 2008 and China＇s financial supervision status quo effectively confirms conclusions of the model.