控制权私利、增长期权与非效率投资行为

Private benefits of control,growth options and inefficient investments

以在控制权私利驱动下公司的非效率投资为研究对象,考察了增长期权对控股股东的非效率投资决策和公司价值的影响,并分析了产生影响的内在机理.研究表明,存在控股股东的公司会产生投资不足行为,但当公司拥有增长期权时,由于控股股东偏好控制权私利的可持续性,增长期权能够减轻投资不足程度,使得控股股东的投资决策与公司价值最大化目标更加一致,显示出增长具有激励作用.同时,投资不足程度会随着,增长因子的增大和控股股东所占股份增加,而得到更快、更明显的缓解,而且在此过程中公司价值将会上升.

This study is about the influence of growth options on inefficient investment and firm value under controlling shareholder settings.Results indicates that controlling shareholder makes under-investment decision which stray from maximum firm value aim but the growth options that firm owned produces alleviating effect to the under-investment because controlling shareholders like the sustainability of private benefits of control.Further more,the greater the growth factor and the more shares that the controlling shareholders owned,the stronger alleviating effects on controlling shareholders＇ under-investment behavior and firm value increases when they have a more single aim.