摘要
本文在交易成本经济学的分析框架下,分析了粮源公司的"中间人"制度安排。该制度将种子行业的部分资产专用性风险转移给对这些风险并不敏感的"中间人",从而在实现连片规模经营要求的同时避免农地流转产生的成本和其他社会问题,同时兼容了商品契约下的激励作用,化解了供需双方特定资产专用性风险。
Based on the analytical framework of transaction cost economics, this paper analyses the "middleman" institutional arrangements of Liangyuan Company. This system can transfer some risk of asset specificity to those "middlemen" who are not sensitive to risk, so that the requirement of scaled land management can be achieved without the costs of rural land circulation and other social problems.
出处
《中国市场》
2011年第3期13-20,共8页
China Market
关键词
“中间人”
交易成本经济学
农地流转
middleman
transaction cost economics
rural land circulation