金字塔结构、终极股东控制权与资本结构——基于中国上市家族企业面板数据的实证研究

Pyramid Structure,Ultimate Shareholder Control and Capital Structure——Empirical Research Based on Chinese Listed Family Enterprises' Panel Data

利用我国303家上市家族企业2007~2009年的面板数据检验金字塔结构下终极股东控制权和资本结构的关系。研究发现：终极控制权处于[50%,100%]区间时,上市家族企业的终极控制权和银行借款率在10%的水平上显著负相关,终极控制权和资产负债率、流动性负债率之间负相关但不显著;终极控制权在[0,30%]区间时,终极控制权与资产负债率、银行借款率负相关但不显著,与流动性负债率正相关但不显著;终极控制权在[30%,50%]区间时,终极控制权与资产负债率、流动性负债率正相关但不显著,与银行借款率负相关但不显著。

Using the Panel data of 303 listed family enterprises from 2007 to 2009,this paper examines relationship between ultimate shareholders control and capital structure in pyramid structure.It finds that： with ultimate control in [50%,100%],ultimate control of listed family enterprises and bank lending rate at 10% are significantly negatively related,but ultimate control and asset-debt ratio,liquid debt ratio are not significantly negatively related.With ultimate control in [0%,30%],ultimate control and asset-debt ratio,bank lending rate are negatively related but not significant,but liquid debt ratio positively related to it but not significant.With ultimate control in[30%,50%],ultimate control and asset-debt ratio,liquid debt ratio are positively related but not significant,and bank lending rate is negatively related to it but not significant.