摘要
利用我国303家上市家族企业2007~2009年的面板数据检验金字塔结构下终极股东控制权和资本结构的关系。研究发现:终极控制权处于[50%,100%]区间时,上市家族企业的终极控制权和银行借款率在10%的水平上显著负相关,终极控制权和资产负债率、流动性负债率之间负相关但不显著;终极控制权在[0,30%]区间时,终极控制权与资产负债率、银行借款率负相关但不显著,与流动性负债率正相关但不显著;终极控制权在[30%,50%]区间时,终极控制权与资产负债率、流动性负债率正相关但不显著,与银行借款率负相关但不显著。
Using the Panel data of 303 listed family enterprises from 2007 to 2009,this paper examines relationship between ultimate shareholders control and capital structure in pyramid structure.It finds that: with ultimate control in [50%,100%],ultimate control of listed family enterprises and bank lending rate at 10% are significantly negatively related,but ultimate control and asset-debt ratio,liquid debt ratio are not significantly negatively related.With ultimate control in [0%,30%],ultimate control and asset-debt ratio,bank lending rate are negatively related but not significant,but liquid debt ratio positively related to it but not significant.With ultimate control in[30%,50%],ultimate control and asset-debt ratio,liquid debt ratio are positively related but not significant,and bank lending rate is negatively related to it but not significant.
出处
《软科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2011年第1期120-123,共4页
Soft Science
基金
教育部人文社会科学基金项目(09YJA790023)
关键词
金字塔结构
终极股东控制权
资本结构
负债的控制效应
破产效应
pyramid structure
ultimate shareholder control
capital structure
debt control effect
bankruptcy effect