摘要
采用进化博弈论理论对大型制造企业分权化管理模式下的工期控制进行了研究。对支付矩阵建立了进化博弈模型,分析了参与者策略选择动态进化过程。研究显示参与者策略选择的稳定性受博弈系统最初状态及支付矩阵相关参数的设定有关。分析得出,在分厂或车间拖期机会成本一定的条件下,作为厂部的管理者可以通过动态复制方程的进化趋势来重新设置系统中激励惩罚数值来提高分厂或车间的完工率。以此来实现对分厂或车间的工期控制,能有效地缩短总的提前期。
In order to research the control of due date of jobs in decentralized Large-scale Manufacturing firm,the evolutionary game theory is adopted.On the base of assumed payoff matrix,the evolutionary game model is constructed to analyze the dynamic evolutionary procedure of participants＇ choice of strategies in games.The result shows that the stabilization of participants＇ strategies is related to the parameters in payoff matrix and influenced by initial status of the game system.Thorough analyzing evolutionary direction of replicator dynamics,the manager of a firm is found can increase the percentage of finishing jobs on time of workshop by resetting the drive-restraint parameters.Applying this method for the control of finishing time of jobs in workshop,the lead time of products can be effectively reduced.
出处
《科学技术与工程》
2011年第2期277-280,共4页
Science Technology and Engineering
关键词
进化博弈论
动态复制方程
支付矩阵
进化稳定策略
evolutionary game theory replicator dynamics payoff matrix evolutionary stable strategies
