非完全信息下低碳技术国际转移博弈研究

Game-Theoretical Study on International Transfer of Low-Carbon Technologies Under Incomplete Information

在非完全信息博弈中,至少有一个参与者对另一个参与者的支付函数是不确定的。为考察非完全信息对低碳技术国际转移的影响,运用博弈论方法构建了一个双向多维非完全信息动态博弈模型,分析技术转移的合作空间、相应的均衡及其政策含义。研究表明,在国际低碳技术转移中,参与方的信息优势并不一定有利;非完全信息导致技术转移协议延迟;为减少逆向选择、增加效率,《联合国气候变化框架公约》应建立适当的技术转移信息沟通机制。

In a game of incomplete information,at least one player is uncertain about another player＇s payoff function.Game theory is applied to investigate the impact of incomplete information on international transfer of low-carbon technologies.This paper establishes a dynamic game model under two-sided and multi-dimensional incomplete information,which is then used to analyze the cooperation room of technology transfer,corresponding equilibrium,and their policy implications.It is shown that information advantages of participants are not necessarily beneficial in international low-carbon technology transfer;incomplete information leads to non-efficiency with the technology transfer agreement being delayed;the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change should establish appropriate information exchange mechanisms on technology transfer to reduce adverse selections and increase the efficiency.