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股改后上市公司股权融资偏好实证研究 被引量:1

An Empirical Study on Equity Financing Preference of the Listed Companies after the Share Reform
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摘要 中国上市公司的股权融资问题一直备受争议与关注。随着股权分置改革的完成,我国上市公司的融资偏好是否发生了变化?通过对股改后股权再融资集中的2006、2007两年内进行股权再融资的上市公司的实证研究,PROB IT模型检验了与控制权收益相关的两个指标以及其他上市公司变量与股权再融资之间的概率关系。终极控股权下的现金流权通过了检验,即现金流权越高的非国有上市公司越倾向于股权再融资;侵占度没有通过检验,这一定程度上说明股权分置改革起到了抑制通过股权再融资获取控制权私利的行为。 Issues regarding equity financing of Chinese listed companies always receive much concern and arouse great controversy.Have the financing preferences of Chinese listed companies changed with the accomplishment of the reform on non-tradable shares? Using the PROBIT model,this article tests the statistical relationship between the two indexes related to control benefits and other variables characteristic of listed companies and equity refinancing,with data on the listed companies who issued seasoned equity offerings in 2006 and 2007 which witnessed intensive equity refinancing since the reform.Cash flow rights under ultimate ownership passed the test,namely,non-state-owned listed companies with higher cash flow rights tend to undertake equity refinancing.Expropriation did not pass the test.This to some extent proves that the non-tradable share reform has helped to restrain agents from obtaining private benefits of control through equity refinancing.
出处 《山东大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》 CSSCI 北大核心 2011年第1期86-91,共6页 Journal of Shandong University(Philosophy and Social Sciences)
关键词 股权分置改革 股权融资 控制权收益 non-tradable share reform equity financing control benefits
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