业绩型股权激励、行权业绩条件与股东财富增长

On the Performance-based Equity Incentives,Exercise Rights Vesting Performance Requirements and the Growth of Shareholders'Wealth

我国上市公司自2006年始实施规范的业绩型经理人股权激励计划。这类股权激励计划能否增加股东财富,其中的行权业绩条件是否及如何影响股东财富增长呢?本文利用经验数据对此展开了研究。结果发现:经理人股权激励计划草案公告的累计超额回报(CAR)显著为正,股权激励计划能给投资者带来正的财富效应;经行业调整后的行权业绩条件指标与CAR显著正相关。本文的发现意味着,业绩型经理人股权激励计划能够增加股东财富,且行权业绩条件要求越高,越有助于股东财富增长。

This paper investigates the impacts of the executive equity incentive plans and exercise rights vesting performance requirements in these plans on the growth of shareholders＇ wealth. The authors document that the capital market reaction to the initial announcements of executive equity incentive plans is positive. The exercise rights vesting performance requirement ratios are significantly positive with CAR. But the valid time length, eq- uity incentive strength and Chairmen of the board of directors, as the incentive employees have no effects on the CAR. These findings suggest that use of performance-based the executive equity incentives does help the growth of shareholders＇ wealth, the stricter vesting performance requirements, the higher the growth of shareholders＇ wealth.