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家族成员组合与公司治理效率:基于家族上市公司的实证研究 被引量:51

Family Member Composition and Its Effect on Corporate Governance:An Empirical Study in China
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摘要 家族成员内部的组合是家族治理安排的重要内容之一,不同的家族成员组合模式将对家族企业治理效率产生不同程度的影响。本文假定家族成员具有利他主义动机、趋同性与行动一致性,但也具有自利动机、目标与偏好差异性。基于此,本文将家族成员的组合模式分为核心家庭成员主导型、远亲家族成员主导型、复合家族成员主导型,并基于中国家族上市公司的数据,以家族持股成员作为分析对象,对这些家族成员组合模式的功效进行了实证检验。本文的研究结论表明:(1)不同家族成员组合内部,其冲突与代理问题是存在差异的,核心家庭成员内部的冲突与代理问题最低,这种组合能够创造最优的治理效率;远亲家族成员内部与复合家族成员内部存在显著的矛盾与代理问题,这种组合明显不利于提高公司治理效率。(2)家族成员为了其自身的家族财富最大化能够凝聚在一起,采取一致性的监督管理者或侵占其他非家族股东利益的行为。但家族成员的一致性行为主要体现在核心家族成员内部以及以核心家庭成员为主的复合家族成员组合中,而远亲家族成员很难采取一致性的决策行为。本文的研究为进一步探索家族公司治理机制的本质提供了一个新的方向。 Few research about family firms considered that family members are homogeneous in decision.But this paper thinks that family members have different goals and preferences because of their different kinship and experience,they are altruistic and selfish with each other,conflicts and agency problems hide in decision.All these issues are so important that cannot be ignored when doing research about family firm governance.Also,this paper do not consider simply that the degree of conflicts and agency problems are same for every different family member,but figure out that conflicts and agency problems will be different for different kinship compositions.This paper classifies family member composition into four categories:nuclear family,extended family,composited family and owner-controlled family.Based on the data of listed family firms in China,this paper makes an analysis of the relationship between family member composition and governance efficiency.The results show that:(1) different family compositions do have different conflicts and agency problems among family members.Specifically,conflicts and agency problems in nuclear family is the least serious,so nuclear family composition is the most efficient way in governing family firms and improving firm value;conflicts and agency problems in extended family and composited family are more serious,so they have a significantly negative relationship with family firm governance efficiency;but the relationship between owner-controlled family and governance efficiency is not stable.(2) Although there are conflicts and agency problems among family members,they will also act consistently in the face of the invading caused by the nonfamily stakeholders,whatever the family member composition is.The family cohesion is especially significant in nuclear family and composited family directed by nuclear family members.In extended families,it is different for them to make agreement in decision,so the relationship between the ownership of extended family members and governance efficiency is not so stable.This study makes a further cognition of family firms,which is so useful in family corporate governance,and it also provides a new research field in family corporate governance.
出处 《南开管理评论》 CSSCI 北大核心 2010年第6期149-160,共12页 Nankai Business Review
基金 国家自然科学基金项目(70872065) 教育部人文社会科学研究项目(08JA630048) 教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划(NCET-08-0804) 上海市曙光计划项目(07SG41)资助
关键词 家族企业 家族成员组合 公司治理 治理效率 Family Firms Family Member Composition Corporate Governance Governance Efficiency
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参考文献50

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