电子政务环境下政府-官员寻租博弈研究

Rent-seeking Game of Government-officials in the Environment of E-government

从成本收益角度,分析了政府实施电子政务前后官员寻租行为.根据寻租现象构建了政府—官员博弈模型,通过引入惩罚力度、查处成本、查处效率、贴现率等变量,分别运用单阶段博弈和重复博弈研究了官员最优寻租决策以及政府最优查处决策,并通过比较政府实施电子政务前后官员和政府行为的变化,得出了政府实施电子政务的条件,为政府治理寻租现象提供了政策性建议.

Rent-seeking behaviors of government officials before the e-government are analyzed from the angle of cost-benefit.Government-officials＇ game model is constructed according to the rent-seeking phenomenon.After the introduction of punitive degree,investigation and punishment cost,survey and prosecute efficiency,discount rate and other variables,the optimal rent-seeking decisions of officials and optimal investigation and punishment decisions of government are studied by means of single game and repeated game respectively.The conditions for conducting e-government and policy suggestions on rent-seeking phenomenon are provided after comparing the behavior differences of government and officials before the e-government is practiced and after.