东亚储备库的成员收益、动力及监督机制:问题及对策

Member Benefits,Incentives and Oversight Mechanisms of the East Asian Reserve Fund:Problems and Solutions

东亚储备库的实质是CMI的多边化。CMI多边化之后,部分成员可获得的贷款额度小于CMI时期。东亚储备库的收益在成员间的配置是不对称的,储备水平较高的经济体并不能从区域储备库中获益。从区域合作主导权的配置看,中、日两国没有获得有效激励。由于东亚各成员间的金融联系弱于各成员与区外的金融联系,东亚储备库缺乏对某一成员的危机做出快速反应的动力机制。东亚区域经济监督机制的建设必须进一步加强,使之成为一个有效且可信的系统。东亚储备库要成为一个更为稳定、有效且运行顺畅的区域合作机制,还需各成员进一步的共同努力。本文就东亚储备库运行过程中的成员收益配置、动力机制和监督机制等问题逐一分析,并提出东亚储备库发展的政策建议以及中国参与该进程的对策。

The East Asian Reserve Fund fundamentally represents the muhilateralization of the CMI. As the CMI becomes multilateral, one outcome will be that not all members receive the same allocation of benefits. The fund faces a number of problems though. First, considering the relative regional influence of the members and the distribution of benefits the fund offers, it is clear that Japan and China obtain only limited benefits and have few incentives to be involved in the Fund. This is especially so as the level of financial integration between the members is less than that between members and some non-member states. This means that there are little incentives for the Fund to respond quickly to a crisis on the part of an individual member. As such, it is critical that the oversight mechanism for the East Asian Reserve Fund be enhanced to make this a credible and effective system. In order for the East Asia Reserve Fund to become a stable, effective and operational institution, the members will need to deepen collective efforts. This paper offers an analysis of the relative operational benefits available to the different members of the East Asia Reserve Fund as well as incentives for participation in the fund and of the corresponding oversight mechanism. On the basis of this it presents policy proposals for the development of the fund and a strategy for China＇s involvement.