期刊文献+

银行资本充足率监管制度的副作用 被引量:8

The Side-effect of Capital Adequacy Regulation
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摘要 资本充足率要求是指银行必须保持与其资产相关的最低资本金水平的法律要求。银行法中对于银行无论何时都一样的资本充足要求的问题在于,它太过于关注防范单个银行发生违约这一狭隘目标上,而很少关注银行为了符合监管要求而采取的低价抛售和信贷紧缩这些应对监管的行动所产生的外部性问题。当个别银行发生流动性问题时,正是资本充足率的法律要求,逼迫单个银行将其实务流动性危机扩散到整个系统,引发社会性的成本。 Capital regulation mandates banks to maintain a minimum capital standard at all time so as to keep banks liquidity.The problem of time-invariant capital requirement is that it places too much emphasis on the objective of averting default of individual bank,without,from a systematic perspective,considering the fire-sale and credit contraction externality aimed to meet the minimum requirement of financial regulation,which transfer the trouble of individual bank to the whole economy.
作者 金华
机构地区 湘潭大学法学院
出处 《武陵学刊》 2011年第1期67-72,共6页 Journal of Wuling
关键词 资本充足 流动性 金融危机 代理问题 外部性 capital adequacy liquidity financial crisis agency problem externality
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参考文献11

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共引文献3

同被引文献45

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