新型农村金融机构改革可行吗?——基于监督效率视角的分析

Is the Reform of New Rural Financial Institutions Feasible?——Analysis from the Perspective of Monitoring Efficiency

本文基于监督机制建立了借款人融资条件决定的道德风险模型,比较分析了各类新型农村金融机构的监督效率及其对农村融资状况的影响。结果表明:现有商业银行缺乏明显的监督比较优势,由其组建的村镇银行和贷款公司将难以长期持续经营;小额贷款公司因需要全部自有资本运营,对民营资本监督效率提出了过高要求而难以在农村地区普遍设立;资金互助社从农户生产经营中内生出来能有效实施相互监督和合同互联,与专业合作社或龙头公司联合发展时可显著改善农村融资状况。当前以商业银行为主导的农村金融增量改革,体现了政府隐性存款担保下国家对于民营资本金融风险的过度防范,以及商业银行为了经营特许权价值作出短期选择的双重契合。进一步的改革需要逐步从国家外生主导模式向民间内生成长模式转变,充分发挥民营资本和各类新型农村经济组织的作用。

Since 1996, China has initiated a new rural financial system reform with introducing many kinds of new rural financial institutions （NRFIs） such as rural bank, （small） credit company and credit cooperative. The feature of the reform is that these institutions are mainly established by current commercial banks, only a few by private enterprises and individuals. Comparing their financing efficiency, we find that current commercial banks operate at higher monitoring costs in rural areas and cannot continue in the long run, and private enterprises in small credit companies will have to be much more efficient than their counterparts in rural banks due to full capital requirement, while credit cooperatives can achieve high efficiency by mutual monitoring. The logics of the reform lie in that under its implicit deposit guarantee, China＇ s government overestimates the risks of financial institutions operated by private enterprises, and chooses current commercial banks to dominate the establishment of NRFIs, which is supported by their consideration of the franchise values of new financial institutions. The future reform model should transform from the dominance of the state to that of rural enterprises and individuals.