控股股东道德风险与公司现金策略

The Moral Hazard of Controlling Shareholder and Corporate Cash Holdings

本文借鉴Myers & Majluf(1984)的模型框架,从控股股东利益最大化的视角构建了公司发行股票为投资项目融资的决策模型。本文模型分析表明,公司控股股东会选择在其自身利益增加的情况下发行股票,但这有可能损害公司原有中小股东的利益。控股股东的这种道德风险将被市场所预期,从而会对公司融资行为形成约束。在这种因控股股东道德风险所引起的融资约束下,公司现金持有策略会发生变化。控股股东出于利益侵占动机增强对现金资产的偏好,导致公司现金—现金流敏感度上升,而公司增持现金的价值效应较低。在实证检验中,本文以2003—2009年沪深两市非金融类A股上市公司作为分析样本,用终极控股股东控制权/现金流权两权分离程度代表公司控股股东利益侵占动机的强弱。检验结果表明,在终极控股股东两权分离程度较大的情况下,公司现金—现金流敏感度较高而现金变动的价值较低,这证实了本文的理论假说。

Based on the framework of Myers and Majluf （1984）＇s model, we build up a theoretical model focusing on how the controlling shareholder makes financing decisions for the company＇s project. The model shows that the decision of share issue is put forward to so long as the interests of the Controlling shareholder increase, while the interests of the original minority shareholders are likely to be damaged. The external investors anticipate the diversion of the controlling shareholder and require a premium for their funds, which results in a kind of constraints on the company. The moral hazard type of financing constraints puts pressures on corporate cash holding decisions, and it is optimal for the controlling shareholder to hold more cash for the purpose of diversion. Consequently the company＇s cash flow sensitivity of cash would increase while the value of cash would decline. Using a sample of 2003--2009 companies listed in Chinese A stock market, we then test the model and find the higher divergence of the ultimate controlling shareholder＇s control rights from cash flow rights is associated with the higher cash flow sensitivity of cash but the lower value of cash, which confirms the prediction of the model.