蒋介石与两广六一事变

Chiang Kai-shek and the June 1st Incident in Guangdong and Guangxi Provinces

蒋介石应对两广六一事变大体上有一整套方针与步骤。事变初露端倪时,蒋静观其变。针对两粤之军事部署以防备为主,取监视与待机方针,欲利用两广之争和广东内部的文武内讧,以政治方式和平解决。事变爆发后,蒋为拆分粤桂,先专对粤。广东问题解决后,冒险撤换李宗仁、白崇禧。借口李、白抗命不服,趁机派兵入粤。待中央军转至西江布防后,开始对桂谋求和平解决。蒋处置两广之方针与步骤虽无明显之失算,为两广问题得以和平解决之关键,但其所运用之手段没有超出中国传统政治术之羁縻反侧的范畴。

In dealing with the June 1st Incident of 1936,Chiang Kai-shek had a general set of aims and measures.In its initial stage,Chiang took a wait-and-see approach.Against the military deployment of the Guangdong and Guangxi warlords,he adopted a defensive attitude and a strategy of watching and waiting,hoping to solve the crisis by taking advantage of the rivalry between the warlords in Guangdong and Guangxi and the internal strife between civil and military officials on the rebel side.After the incident occurred,Chiang gave most of his attention to tackling the trouble in Guangdong.Following his success there,he took the risky step of dismissing Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi from their positions and then,under the pretext of their refusal of new assignments given them by the central government,dispatched troops to Guangdong.After the Central Army was deployed in Xijiang area,he sought to solve the problem peacefully.Although one cannot point to clear miscalculations in Chiang’s aims and measures,which were crucial in resolving the crisis,his tactics did not go beyond China’s traditional art of politics,in which one defeats the enemy without fighting.