摘要
Molnar协议是射频识别(RFID)系统中读写器与标签之间的双边认证协议,同时强调能够保护标签的位置隐私,而协议安全性尚未得到形式化的分析和证明。在eHa模型下,严格地证明了Molnar协议具有不可预测的强隐私性,并得到确切的安全界。协议的证明使用了基于Game的方法,将协议的隐私性紧致地归约到伪随机函数的输出与随机函数的输出多项式时间不可区分的假设上,对分析和解决RFID系统安全性问题有效而通用。
Molnar protocol is a scheme for mutual authentication between tags and readers in Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) system, which emphasizes protecting privacy for the tag; however, its security has not been proved formally. By using the ella model, a formal proof was given, in which the output of the Molnar protocol maintain unpredictable, denoted as un-privacy. Moreover, the accurate security boundary of the Molnar protocol was computed. The privacy of protocol was reduced tightly on the assumption that the output of pseudorandom functions was indistinguishable from the output of random functions in polynomial time by utilizing the game-based technique. This technique is a powerful tool for analyzing and solving the privacy problem of RFID system, and provides an effective and universal solution.
出处
《计算机应用》
CSCD
北大核心
2011年第3期798-800,804,共4页
journal of Computer Applications
关键词
射频识别
安全模型
强隐私性
可证明安全
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID)
security model
strong privacy
provable security