突发事件下供应链企业间援助行为分析被引量：1

Analysis of Assistance between Supply Chain Corporations in Disruption

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摘要通过对比分析,证明了援助策略能够提高供应链的绩效,并运用极小极大后悔方法求出了只知道突发事件造成损失的范围情况下零售商的最优援助资金额,最后运用动机公平博弈理论分析了供应商"投桃报李"特征对援助效果的影响。 This paper proves that assistance strategy can improve supply chain performance through comparative analysis,and works out retailer＇s optimal financial aid by using minimax regret under such a situation that enterprises only know the scope of loss caused by disruption.Then it analyzes the impact of supplier＇s ＂reciprocate＂ on the aid effectiveness by using motivation fairness game theory.

作者于辉邓亮

机构地区重庆大学经济与工商管理学院

出处《软科学》 CSSCI 北大核心 2011年第2期116-120,共5页 Soft Science

基金国家自然科学基金资助项目(7087112690924009) 教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划基金项目(NCET-10-0843) 中央高校基本科研业务费资助项目(CDJSK100211)

关键词突发事件企业援助极小极大后悔法动机公平博弈 disruption corporation assistance minimax regret motivation fairness game

分类号 F406.2 [经济管理—产业经济]

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参考文献14

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